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Abstract
Theory and research regarding moral motivation has focused for decades
on the roles of moral reasoning and, to some extent, moral emotion. Recently, however, several models of morality have positioned identity as an
additional important source of moral motivation. An individual has a moral
identity to the extent that he or she has constructed his or her sense of self
around moral concerns (e.g., moral values). This paper reviews theory and
research linking moral identity to moral behavior and commitment. Additionally, it suggests several key unanswered questions about moral identity
and provides recommendations for future research.
Keywords: Moral development, Moral identity, Moral motivation

In the last century, numerous theories of moral functioning have been
proposed, each with its own assumptions about what motivates moral
action. One of the first and most influential theories of morality, Kohlberg’s [1969] cognitive developmental theory, focused largely on the
role of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hoffman’s [1970] moral socialization theory emphasized moral emotion. More recently, some scholars have suggested that moral motivation is more fully understood by
considering the role of the self in morality, often termed moral self or
moral identity [Hart, in press; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a]. For example, Blasi [1995] suggests that in moral identity, moral concerns (e.g.,
moral principles, goals, and commitments) are ‘integrated with one’s

digitalcommons.unl.edu

Hardy & Carlo in Human Development 48 (2005)

2

motivational and emotional systems; are made the object of agentic
processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as a basis
for the construction of one’s self-concept and identity’ (pp 233– 234).
Others have posited that moral identity entails the unity of self and
moral systems [Colby & Damon, 1992], and involves ‘[having] an explicit theory of yourself as a moral agent – as one who acts on the basis of respect and/or concern for the rights and/or welfare of others’
[Moshman, 2005, p. 121].
Scholars are increasingly convinced that identity may play an important part in moral functioning, but links between identity and morality remain unclear, both conceptually and empirically. Hence, the
purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of the literature
regarding moral identity, as well as to suggest future directions that
may move the field forward in being able to more fully understand
moral motivation. Specifically, we will first make an argument for
the importance of exploring the role of identity in moral functioning. Second, we will suggest Blasi’s [1983, 1984, 1995] moral identity
model as a promising start for understanding links between identity
and morality. Third, we will review empirical research on moral identity. Lastly, we will outline critical questions that should be addressed
regarding moral identity and suggest directions for how to best approach these issues.

Moral Motivation: A Theoretical Review
Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotion as Sources of Moral Motivation
In the late 1950s, Lawrence Kohlberg constructed his highly influential
Cognitive-Developmental Theory of morality [Kohlberg, 1969]. Kohlberg assumed that moral principles, when understood, would inherently motivate moral action. He posited that, as moral reasoning develops, individuals become more prone to utilize moral principles in
making judgments in moral situations. At higher stages of moral reasoning, moral principles and their universal and prescriptive nature
become more salient; as a result, individuals feel more compelled to
behave consistent with their moral judgments. The motivation for
moral action, then, stems directly from moral understanding; other
facets of morality, such as emotion, play minor roles in this process.
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Many contemporary approaches to morality stemming from Kohlberg’s theory, such as Social Domain Theory [Turiel, 2002], similarly
emphasize the role of cognition in moral functioning.
In contrast to cognitive approaches, Martin Hoffman outlined a
theory focused on the role of moral emotion in morality [Hoffman,
1970, 2000]. Moral emotion is seen as the primary source of moral
motivation. Specifically,
(…) abstract moral principles, learned in ‘cool’ didactic contexts (lectures, sermons), lack motive force. Empathy’s contribution to moral principles is to transform them into prosocial hot cognitions – cognitive representations charged with
empathic affect, thus giving them motive force. [Hoffman,
2000, p. 239]
So, while moral understanding helps focus and direct moral emotion, it is emotion that provides the motivating ‘spark’ that leads to
action. Some other scholars also emphasize the role of emotion, although to a lesser extent than Hoffman [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986].
Most approaches to morality acknowledge the role of moral cognition and moral emotion in moral motivation, but differ in their stance
on which is primary in the process of motivating moral behavior. Further, some more integrative perspectives suggest that moral cognition
and moral emotion are interlinked, and that both can function as primary sources of moral motivation [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003].
This is more in line with research indicating the interconnected and
inseparable nature of moral cognition and moral emotion [Damasio,
1994; Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991]. However, there are conceptual and empirical reasons to question whether moral understanding and moral emotion, even when considered jointly, can adequately
account for the motivation of moral action.
Conceptually, although moral cognitive-emotional sources of motivation can motivate moral action in some individuals in some situations, they cannot alone account for extraordinary moral action, consistent moral behavior, and enduring moral commitment. For this,
it seems there might be moderating factors between moral cognitive-emotional motivation sources and moral action. As some scholars suggest [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Rest, 1983], in any given situation
there are multiple motives compelling the individual towards different courses of action. A moral cognitive-emotional motive, then, will
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likely be just one of several motives in a moral situation. Ultimately,
the individual decides which of these motives to act on. Thus, he or
she can choose whether or not to follow moral cognitive-emotional
motives; the mere presence of these motives does not guarantee moral
action will result. In fact, it is easy to conceptualize situations where
individuals may know the right thing to do, feel emotionally prompted
to take the moral course of action, but decide to do otherwise. Hence,
moderators may exist that affect the relative importance of moral cognitive-emotional motives.
Empirically, research has generally shown moral reasoning [Blasi,
1980] and moral emotion [Eisenberg & Miller, 1987] to be positively
associated with moral action, but only moderately. Thus, moral cognitive-emotional motives do not fully account for moral action; there is
significant variability in moral behavior left unexplained. Given moderate relations between moral reasoning and action, Blasi [1980] became skeptical of Kohlberg’s notion that moral judgment is directly
linked to moral action, and urged scholars to search for potential moderating factors. The same can be said for links between moral emotion and moral action.
Identity as a Source of Moral Motivation
In addition to moral understanding and moral emotion, some scholars
have suggested that identity may play a role in motivating moral action [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs,
2003; Hoffman, 2000; Kohl-berg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Monroe, 2001; Narvaez & Lapsley, in press; Nisan, 2004;
Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982]. The various models proposed
by these theorists are unified in suggesting that when morality is important and central to one’s sense of self and identity, it heightens
one’s sense of obligation and responsibility to live consistent with
one’s moral concerns. Some also emphasize how the self-importance
of morality is linked to the relative prioritization of moral values in
one’s value system, which impacts the likelihood of moral values being acted upon in moral situations [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Eisenberg, 1986;
Narvaez & Lapsley, in press; Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982].
Further, identity is seen by some as a supplemental source of moral
motivation that provides a boost beyond the motivation available from
moral understanding and moral emotion alone; in this sense, it is
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useful in explaining extraordinary moral action and enduring moral
commitment [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986;
Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000].
Although several models of morality position a role for identity,
Blasi’s model of moral identity includes the most elaborated conception of identity [Blasi, 1988, 1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995], and
the most detailed linkages between identity and moral functioning
[Blasi, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2004b]. Thus Blasi’s explanation of moral
identity has been the most extensive and has yielded the most insight
regarding mechanisms underlying moral identity as a source of moral
motivation. While identity is central to Blasi’s understanding of morality, in the models proposed by most other scholars it is more of an
appendage [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Narvaez & Lapsley,
in press; Rest, 1983]. Most other models emphasize the role of other
facets of morality, such as moral understanding [Gibbs, 2003; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Rest, 1983], moral
emotion [Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000], and moral schemas [Narvaez
& Lapsley, in press], and only minimally explicate the role of moral
identity. Further, when discussing the place of identity in moral functioning, most other models of morality either draw on Blasi’s model
[e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; Kohlberg
& Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Monroe, 2001; Narvaez
& Lapsley, in press; Nisan, 2004; Rest, 1983] or present ideas largely
consistent with Blasi’s [e.g., Hoffman, 2000; Schwartz & Howard,
1982]. Thus, we will use Blasi’s ideas as a framework for our discussion of links between moral identity and moral action.
Blasi’s Model of Moral Identity
In an attempt to fill the gap between moral understanding and moral
action left by Kohlberg’s theory, Blasi [1983] proposed his Self Model
of moral functioning. This model has three key components. First, before leading to moral action, a moral judgment can also pass through
a judgment of responsibility, such that ‘an action, evaluated as moral,
is also judged to be strictly necessary for the individual’ [Blasi, 1983,
p. 198]. Hence, a person might not only decide the ‘right’ or ‘moral’
way to proceed in a given situation, but might also assess whether or
not he or she feels responsible for acting on that judgment. Second,
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the criteria for judgments of responsibility often stem from the structure of an individual’s self. More specifically, what Blasi called moral
identity reflects individual differences in the extent to which being
moral is a central or essential characteristic of the sense of self. The
third component of the Self Model is self-consistency. Blasi suggested
there is a natural human tendency to want to live consistent with one’s
sense of self; hence, when one’s self is centered on moral concerns,
this inclination serves as a key motivating force for moral action. In
summary, Blasi postulated that moral judgments might more reliably
predict moral behavior if they are filtered through responsibility judgments based on moral identity, and propelled into action via the tendency toward self-consistency.
More recently Blasi [1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] has elaborated ideas about the structure of identity that can help us understand
the role of identity in morality. He posited there are ‘two aspects that
make up a concrete identity, namely the specific contents around which
one’s sense of self is constructed (moral ideals are one such content)
and the modes in which identity is subjectively experienced, seem to
be largely independent of each other, though not exactly orthogonal’
[Blasi, 1993, p. 117]. Thus, similar to James’ [1961/1892] notion of the
me and the I, Blasi is calling attention to both an objective (identity
content) and a subjective (identity experience) side of identity.
As subjective identity matures, several important changes occur
[Blasi, 1988, 2001, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Oresick, 1987].
The sense of self becomes based more on internal, psychological identity contents, such as values and goals, rather than external identity
contents such as physical characteristics, relationships, and behaviors. Additionally, the self becomes more organized and unified. An
important part of this is the hierarchical organization of identity contents such that some are chosen as more central and essential to one’s
sense of self than others. Subjective identity maturity also entails an
increasing sense of agency over one’s self, such that the identity contents one cares most about are actively appropriated into one’s core
self. This is coupled with a heightened sense of possession or ownership over one’s identity, such that one feels responsible for protecting his or her identity and actualizing it in daily life. In other words,
with mature subjective identity there is a greater desire for self-consistency; fidelity with one’s core self is seen as a necessity, and selfinconsistency elicits intense negative affect.
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Merging Blasi’s ideas regarding the structure of identity with his
framework for morality yields a model of how identity might serve
as a source of motivation for moral action. In addition to understanding the objective importance of morality, for many people, moral concerns are also important to their sense of who they are. However,
among these individuals with moral identity contents (e.g., moral values and goals), there is variability in identity experience. Blasi [1993]
describes this issue as follows:
(…) several individuals may see morality as essential to their
sense of self, of who they are. For some of them, however,
moral ideals and demands happen to be there, a given of their
nature over which they feel little control. In this case moral
ideals exist next to other characteristics, all equally important simply because they are there. Others instead relate to
their moral ideals as being personally chosen over other ideals or demands, sense their fragility, and feel responsible to
protect them and to thus protect their sense of self. (p. 103)
Hence, links between moral identity contents and moral action might
be moderated by subjective identity maturity. More specifically, the
motivational force of moral identity contents should increase as they
are actively appropriated into the core self. When moral concerns are
self-appropriated, the heightened self-consistency motive and commitment to actualize one’s core self (characteristic of mature subjective identity) can act as powerful sources of moral motivation.
Strengths and Limitations of Blasi’s Model
While a number of scholars have proposed a moral motivational role
for the self, Blasi’s approach has several strengths that seem to set it
apart. First, more than other models, Blasi’s positions a central role
for the self. Blasi argues that focusing on moral understanding and
moral emotions provides a limited picture of moral motivation; the
self’s stance towards morality is also critically important. Further, as
any adequate model of moral identity should, Blasi’s fuses theoretical
notions of morality and identity. His model includes an articulate conception of identity [Blasi, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995], complete with
detailed bridges linking it to moral functioning [Blasi, 1993, 1995, in
press]. This attention to detail and thorough coverage of both sides of
moral identity sets Blasi’s model apart from others.
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Second, in blending his notions of identity with a self-based model
of morality, Blasi has provided the most elaborated description of how
identity motivates moral action. Specifically, Blasi delineates how maturation in experiential identity is associated with an increasing desire for one’s life to remain consistent with one’s inner sense of self
[Blasi, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Oresick, 1987], and when
this inner self is centered on moral concerns, it can provide powerful moral motivation [Blasi, 1993, 1995, in press]. Most other morality models that include a role for the self-provide minimal, if any, details regarding the structure of the self and mechanisms for linking it
to moral functioning.
Third, Blasi’s [2001, 2004a, in press] model paints a more agentic picture of morality, where individual differences in moral desires,
rather than differences in morally-relevant capacities (e.g., empathy,
moral reasoning, or moral schemas), are the root of individual differences in moral behavior. Agentic views on the self are becoming increasingly popular among contemporary theorists as they realize the
important implications of such views [Little, Snyder, & Wehmeyer, in
press]. According to Blasi [2001, 2004a], identity maturity is associated with an increasing sense of agency, which leads individuals to appropriate certain aspects of themselves (e.g., values, goals, personality traits, and emotions) as central to their sense of self, while merely
accepting or even rejecting others. This process produces feelings of
ownership over those aspects chosen as core identity contents, along
with a sense of obligation and commitment to protect and actualize
them. Individuals are not simply receptacles that obtain moral understanding through cognitive development and socialization; rather, they
selectively and deliberately infuse moral values with personal importance by integrating them into their sense of self. An agentic view of
moral identity, such as Blasi’s, is critical because it gives individuals
more control over and responsibility for their own morality, and with
this, holds them more accountable for it.
Lastly, by founding his moral identity model firmly on moral understanding, Blasi [2004b] ensures that the moral identity he describes is truly ‘moral.’ Essentially, when one has a moral identity:
One continues to behave morally because moral norms and
ideals are good and desirable; but, in addition, because acting
against one’s core commitments would be a self-betrayal and
damaging to one’s sense of self. The desire to maintain one’s
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identity and to be consistent with it does not corrupt the nature of morality because moral identity was constructed on
the person’s caring about morality as it objectively is. [Blasi,
2004b, p. 343]
Thus, one need not be concerned, as some have suggested [Nucci,
2004], that Blasi is proposing a form of ‘ethical egoism.’ Blasi is not
merely posing the desire for self-consistency as a source of moral motivation; rather, moral action is motivated by a desire to remain consistent with one’s identity as a moral person, concerned about morality.
Blasi’s insightful and intriguing ideas regarding identity and morality have inspired interest in moral identity, and are beginning to
spur empirical investigation into this facet of morality [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a]. Still, there are several areas in which the model could
be extended. First, it is unclear how Blasi’s moral identity model applies to moral behaviors that are to some degree automatic and less
deliberate. Blasi [1999] insists, consistent with the principle of phenomenalism, that behavior, to be considered ‘moral,’ must stem intentionally from conscious moral reasons. Yet, if as Lapsley and Narvaez (in press) argue, much of daily social cognitive functioning is
tacit and automatic, then strict adherence to phenomenalism drastically reduces the moral domain to behaviors that are fairly uncommon to everyday life. Blasi [2004b] has acknowledged that although
morality must be grounded in moral understanding, the type of moral
understanding required for behavior to be considered moral may be
‘implicit and un-verbalized’ (p. 339). However, more discussion of the
processes linking moral identity to the more implicit modes of moral
functioning would be helpful.
Second, in Blasi’s model, identity does not typically emerge as an
important source of moral motivation until young adulthood. Moral
motivation stemming from identity results when a mature identity is
centered on moral concerns. However, the form of subjective identity necessary to provide a strong desire to maintain consistency with
one’s sense of self as a moral person is not typically experienced until at least adolescence, and even thereafter, is not present in the majority of individuals. For most people, particularly prior to adulthood,
morality is not motivated by identity; rather, it will stem from other
concerns, such as the desire to uphold moral principles. But, as Blasi
[1984, 1995, 2004b] indicates, these other moral motives may be less
compelling than moral identity and, therefore, less reliable in their
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ability to yield moral behavior. Thus, Blasi’s model could be extended
by a discussion of the ways moral concerns may be integrated into
personality, in addition to appropriation into identity, that will enrich our understanding of moral motivation and commitment at earlier ages [Blasi, 1993, 2001].
Third, Blasi’s moral identity model does not include adequate discussion of developmental processes and antecedents. In line with Damon’s [1984] observation, Blasi [1995] assumes that identity and
morality are two psychological systems that initially develop independently and later become integrated or united in some individuals during or following adolescence; yet this integrative process has
not been sufficiently detailed. In terms of identity, Blasi [1988, 2001,
2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] outlined a series of developmentally ordered modes of experiential identity, but has only minimally discussed
the processes of individual developmental progression, and has not
addressed factors that may facilitate or hinder these processes. Moreover, Blasi has given little discussion to why and how some individuals center their identity on moral concerns, but others do not. Greater
attention to these issues might make Blasi’s model more complete and
more practically useful.
Lastly, Blasi’s model might be enriched by further detailing the
role of emotion. The importance of emotion in identity [Bosma & Kunnen, 2001] and morality [Carlo, in press; Hoffman, 2000] has been
noted by others. Although Blasi [in press] does emphasize the place of
affective components such as motivation and desire, it is sometimes
unclear what role emotions play. For example, it would be helpful to
know how moral emotions, such as empathy, might be involved in
moral identity formation and in linking identity to action.
Blasi’s model is by no means the final word on moral identity;
rather, we propose it as a good starting point for further investigation into moral motivation, and more specifically links between identity and morality. To this end, we feel it is deserving of more attention
by those interested in moral functioning. As yet, Blasi’s notions have
been the subject of little empirical research. Further, there has been a
lack of critical dialogue pertaining to Blasi’s ideas [for exceptions, see
Monroe, 2001; Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002]. Thus, we advocate more
conceptual and empirical examination of Blasi’s model.
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Moral Identity and Moral Action: An Empirical Review
The notion of moral identity has thus far primarily attracted theoretical and philosophical attention rather than empirical research. It is
unclear why this is the case. Possibly the abstract and complex nature
of identity and morality has made moral identity overly difficult to operationalize and systematically examine. Additionally, Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental paradigm continues to overwhelm other emergent approaches to morality. Regardless, the fact is that we have very
little empirical research that has directly investigated and validated
the moral identity construct. Much of the evidence that we do have
is reviewed below, and provides some validation for the position that
identity may play an important role in moral motivation.
Studies of Moral Exemplars
Some scholars study moral commitment through detailed examination of morally exemplary individuals, at times comparing them to
non-exemplars [e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Monroe, 2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Reimer,
2003; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004]. Often insight can be gleaned
from these studies regarding the role of moral identity in moral motivation. For example, Colby and Damon [1992] concluded from their
in-depth exploration of adult moral exemplars (nominated by philosophers, scholars, theologians, and religious leaders) that individuals whose lives are devoted to moral causes tend to experience unity
between their self and moral goals such that, ‘their own interests
[are] synonymous with their moral goals’ (p. 299). These individuals exemplify Blasi’s [in press] moral identity in that they seemed to
have constructed their identities around morality to the point that
there was no struggle to reconcile their moral principles and commitments with their personal goal and desires or other aspects of
their identities. For, as Blasi [2001] states, ‘the apex of moral motivation (…) is to desire the morally good in the same way one desires what satisfies one’s most intimate and deepest needs’ (p. 319).
Colby and Damon [1992] note that this fusion of morality and self
is likely evident to some degree in most adults, but in moral exemplars it is more of a complete unity.
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Other studies have compared adolescent moral exemplars (nominated by community leaders) to non-exemplar teens. For example,
Hart and Fegley [1995] administered a semi-structured interview measure of self-concept to 15 exemplars and 15 comparison teens. They
discovered that adolescent moral exemplars more frequently used
moral personality traits (e.g., honest) and moral goals (e.g., help others) to describe themselves than comparison teens. Reimer and WadeStein [2004] reported similar findings from their study which used
a sophisticated computational model (Latent Semantic Analysis) to
compare self-descriptors with self-representations in semantic space.
Self-related perceptions were gathered from 15 adolescent moral exemplars and 15 comparison teens using a semi-structured interview
similar to that used by Hart and Fegley [1995]. Of the self-descriptors most closely associated with the actual self-representations of the
participants (the type of person they currently are), a greater portion
was positive, moral, or caring among the exemplars than the comparison teens. Results of these studies seem in line with Blasi’s [1995]
conception of moral identity in that the salient self-representations
of teens who exhibited high levels of moral commitment and action
were more morally based than those of comparison teens. However,
self-representations seem to only capture a small piece of the essence
of Blasi’s moral identity. In other words, self-representations reflect
how one sees oneself, not necessarily what one sees as most central or
important to one’s sense of self. Further, self-representations largely
tap identity contents; hence, the subjective side of Blasi’s moral identity is not adequately accounted for in these studies.
In short, while many people might understand the objective importance of moral concerns, individuals who exhibit high levels of
commitment to moral causes are more likely than others to construct
their self-concept and identity around these moral concerns. Not only
do moral exemplars define themselves in moral terms, but their personal desires are in line with their moral principles. Because of this,
they are compelled to live according to moral principles such that they
feel they can do no other, and the thought of betraying these principles is aversive. Thus, studies of moral exemplars provide some support for Blasi’s [2004b, in press] notion that the self-importance and
identity centrality of moral concerns might serve as a motive capable
of sustaining stable and substantial moral commitment.
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Studies of Moral Identity and Moral Behavior
Rather than using moral commitment and behavior as a criterion for
sample selection, as in exemplar studies, other researchers have measured moral identity as an a-priori predictor of moral behavior. For
example, Arnold [1993] examined links between the self-importance
of morality and moral behavior among adolescents. Moral self was assessed using the Good-Self Assessment, which involved a pictorial-self
task adapted from Harter and Monsour [1992]. As part of this task
participants were first presented with a diagram of three concentric
circles, each corresponding to a different degree of centrality to the
self. Then, they were given a zip-lock bag containing 16 labels, each
with a different virtue written on it; some of the virtues were moral
(e.g., fair to others), while others were not (e.g., creative). Participants
were then asked to place each label in the appropriate circle in order
to indicate those virtues that are most central, less central, and least
central to who they are (only three labels could be placed in the innermost circle). In addition, participants were interviewed and asked
for reasons why they selected the three most central virtues as the
most important to them. Based on the placement of the virtue labels,
a 6-point moral identification scale was created to reflect the degree
to which adolescents identified more with moral, as opposed to nonmoral virtues. Also, a scale for moral motivation was created based
on the extent to which participants gave ‘moral’ reasons for choosing
their central virtues. Moral behavior was assessed using the Ethical
Behavior Rating Scale [Hill & Swanson, 1985], a teacher-report measure of various morally-relevant behavioral tendencies (sample item:
‘Speaks out for fairness for others as well as self’). Analyses revealed
that both moral identification and moral motivation positively predicted moral behavior. Thus, teens who selected moral virtues as central to their sense of self and gave moral reasons for caring about these
virtues were reported as exhibiting higher levels of moral behavior.
A more recent study examined behavioral correlates of moral self
longitudinally among late adolescents [Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, &
Alisat, 2003]. Participants were presented 12 values and asked to rate
the extent to which each ‘should be important for them in their lives’
(6 moral and 6 non-moral values). To create a moral self-scale, the
total for the non-moral values was subtracted from the total for the
moral values. The outcome measure was a community involvement
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scale that assessed frequency of involvement in community (e.g., volunteering with service organization), political (e.g., collecting signatures for a petition), responding (e.g., giving money), and helping
(e.g., visiting the sick) activities. Moral self at Time 1 was positively
associated with overall community involvement at Time 1 as well as
with the four subscales of community involvement. Further, Time 2
moral self was positively correlated with overall community involvement at Time 2 and with three of the four subscales (moral self was
not significantly associated with political activities). Longitudinally,
Time 1 moral self did not significantly predict Time 2 community involvement (controlling for Time 1 community involvement). However,
Time 1 community involvement was positively associated with Time 2
moral self (controlling for Time 1 moral self). The strongest link was
between helping activities and later moral self. These findings are in
line with Youniss and Yates’ [1997] work in suggesting that, although
there might be a positive link between moral self and prosocial behavior, involvement in prosocial activities may precede the importance of
moral values to the self.
Aquino and Reed [2002] have explored links between moral identity and various moral behaviors in adults. They conceptualize moral
identity as a form of social identity as well as ‘a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits’ (p. 1424). Thus they assume that
although the content of individual moral identities may differ somewhat (e.g., an emphasis on caring versus justice), there ‘exists a set of
common moral traits likely to be central to most people’s moral selfdefinitions’ [Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1424]. Hence, they argue that,
‘to measure moral identity, it should not be necessary, in principle, to
discover the entire universe of traits that might compose a person’s
unique moral identity. Rather, all that is needed to invoke and subsequently measure the self-importance of a person’s moral identity is to
activate a subset of moral traits that are linked to other moral traits
that may be more central to a particular person’s self-concept’ [Aquino
& Reed, 2002, pp 1424f.].
Through a series of several different studies, Aquino and Reed
[2002] created a 10-item questionnaire for assessing moral identity
in adults. This self-report paper-and-pencil measure involves (1) presenting participants with a list of nine moral traits, (2) asking them
to visualize a person with those traits (their self or someone else) and
how that person would think, feel, and act, and (3) having them rate
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statements such as, ‘It would make me feel good to be a person who
has these characteristics.’ Based on the properties of identity outlined
by Erikson [1964], Aquino and Reed [2002] identified two 5-item subscales: one to indicate ‘the respondent’s actions in the world’ (labeled
symbolization) and another to tap ‘the degree to which the moral
traits are central to the self-concept’ (labeled internalization).
Aquino, Reed, and colleagues have conducted several studies to assess the validity of their measure and its ability to predict moral behavior. For example, among college alumni, they reported that both
internalization and symbolization positively predicted self-report volunteerism (controlling for age, gender, and social desirability) [Aquino
& Reed, 2002]. However, among adolescents, internalization but not
symbolization was significantly positively related to actual donation
behavior. In follow-up studies, moral identity, particularly the internalization dimension, has been positively related to various morally
relevant social (e.g., inter-group relations, such as regard for outgroup members) [Reed & Aquino, 2003] and negatively associated
with lying in business negotiations [Aquino, Ray, & Reed, 2003].
A final study with implications for moral identity examined links
between moral self and antisocial behavior in late adolescents [Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001]. Using an adapted version of Arnold’s [1993] Good-Self Assessment, Barriga et al. [2001] assessed
moral self-relevance, defined as ‘the centrality to the self-concept of
moral virtues’ (p. 542). This measure included 8 moral and 8 nonmoral virtues. The moral self-relevance scale was created by subtracting the average ratings on the non-moral virtues from the average on
the moral virtues. Antisocial behavior was measured using the Externalizing Behaviors Subscale from Achenbach’s parent-report Child
Behavior Checklist and self-report Youth Self-Report Form. Moral
self-relevance was negatively associated with antisocial behavior (externalizing), controlling for gender, internalizing behaviors, self-serving cognitive distortion, and moral judgment.
In summary, although the research on moral identity and behavioral outcomes is sparse, results thus far generally validate Blasi’s
conception of moral identity as a source of moral motivation. Specifically, teens and adults who reported moral values and virtues as being
more important to their self-concept or more central to their identity
also more frequently engaged in moral behavior. However, although
the moral identity measures in these studies provide a window into
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individuals’ identity contents, they do not adequately account for the
more experiential aspects of identity emphasized by Blasi, such as
unity and organization, or conative facets such as agency and the desire for self-consistency [Blasi, 2004b, in press]. Thus, although these
studies suggest moral identity may be able to motivate moral behavior, they provide limited information regarding how and why.
Conclusions drawn from results of studies on moral identity and
behavior should be tentative for two reasons. First, regarding effect
sizes for relations between moral self and behavior, only effects reported by Arnold [1993] were relatively large (η values of 0.47–0.60);
effects for all other studies were small to moderate (η values of 0.07–
0.27). It is unclear whether there is a conceptual reason for this variability in effect sizes or whether it is due to differences in methodology or sample characteristics. Second, work by Pratt et al. [2003]
and others [Youniss & Yates, 1997] reminds us that the direction of
causality between moral identity and moral behavior is still unclear.
While moral identity might motivate moral action, these studies suggest that, at least in adolescence, involvement in moral action may
precede moral identity development. Bidirectional relations between
moral identity and behavior also seem plausible, in that involvement
in moral action may promote moral identity development, which then
motivates subsequent moral behavior and commitment. This possibility is not incongruous with Blasi’s [2001] ideas on moral identity,
for Blasi argues that mature moral identity is rare prior to late adolescence and young adulthood. However, thus far, there is no firm evidence that moral identity precedes or causes moral behavior, and insufficient evidence to support the inverse relation. In short, empirical
investigation of moral identity is just beginning, leaving much work
to be done before any conclusions can be drawn.
Other Relevant Research
Other areas of research not specifically directed at understanding
moral identity also provide support for the notion of moral identity as
a motivation for moral behavior. For example, attributional research
has found that children given prosocial character attributions by caregivers are more likely to behave pro-socially and thus act consistent
with their attributed self-concept as prosocial individuals [Grusec &
Redler, 1980]. Additionally, according to Deci and Ryan [1991], when
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individuals internalize certain values, they ‘fully assimilate them (…)
accept them as their own, and bring them into consistent relation to
the other needs, processes, and values that represent self’ (p. 255).
In line with this, it was found that children’s prosocial internalization
was positively associated with empathy and relatedness with others
[Ryan & Connell, 1989]. Lastly, Verplanken and Holland [2002] conducted a series of experiments on value centrality, defined as when
certain values ‘make up part of one’s self-definition and, thus, contribute to one’s sense of identity’ (p. 435). Their findings indicated that
value-congruent behavior only results when values are both central
to the self and are activated (i.e., brought to one’s attention or made
more accessible); however, they suggested that such activation occurs
frequently in everyday situations. For example, they found that altruistic values were related to donating behavior only if they were central
to the self, and only for participants in an enhanced self-focus condition of the experiment. From this series of studies they concluded that
‘the self might function as a crucial structure that mediates between
values and behavior’ [Verplanken & Holland, 2002, p. 444]. In short,
congruent with Blasi’s [1995; in press] model of moral identity, these
areas of research demonstrate the importance of the self, and the values and attributes it is comprised of, in motivating moral action.

Future Directions for Research on Moral Identity
Unanswered Questions
The concept of moral identity emerged in the social sciences literature
over two decades ago, largely spurred by Blasi’s [1980, 1983, 1984]
work in the early 1980s. However, although Blasi set the stage for conceptual discussion of moral identity, empirical research on moral identity has been slow in coming; thus, the field must continue to move
beyond mere philosophizing and theorizing about moral identity to
a more thoughtful and innovative empirical examination of the construct. As scholars embark on this effort, there are several specific
questions that seem most urgent. A few of these are discussed below.
First, what is the causal nature of relations between moral identity and moral behavior? Most work on moral identity presents it
as a source of motivation for, and thus a precursor of, moral action.
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However, longitudinal studies have yielded information that suggests
relations between moral identity and moral action may be complex.
Specifically, Pratt et al. [2003] found that, whereas moral self did not
predict later community involvement among adolescents, the inverse
effect was significant, in that community involvement predicted subsequent moral self. These results echo the qualitative findings reported
by Youniss and Yates [1997] in their study of the youth service learning program. Both studies reported results that suggest positive associations between moral identity and moral action, at least in adolescence, may be due to the influence of moral action on one’s identity
rather than the other way around. However, these studies were restricted to adolescence; thus, the conclusion that the effect from moral
action to moral identity may be stronger than the inverse (identity to
action), may primarily be true for this age period, during which identity formation is occurring. It is possible that relations between moral
identity and moral behavior are bidirectional in that involvement in
moral action influences moral identity formation, and moral identity
subsequently acts as a source of moral motivation and commitment
[Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Youniss & Yates, 1997]. More longitudinal work is needed to further untangle the nature of causal relations
between moral identity and moral action. Moreover, moral identity
research thus far has been nonexperimental; hence, causal interpretation of results should be tentative and future experimental or quasiexperimental research is welcome.
Second, what mechanisms link moral identity to moral action? A
few scholars have outlined ideas that provide a good starting point
for understanding this issue. For example, as discussed earlier, Blasi’s [1983, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2004b] work provides one perspective
on how moral identity might act as a source of moral motivation. His
Self-Model of moral functioning positions identity as a possible mediating factor between moral understanding and moral action [Blasi,
1983]. Additionally, his ideas about the structure of identity help us
understand how it might be able to provide the motivational spark for
moral action, with a focus on the role of the need for self-consistency
that increases as a function of subjective identity maturity [Blasi,
1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Milton, 1991; Blasi & Oresick, 1987; Glodis & Blasi, 1993]. Essentially, one has a moral identity
to the extent that he or she has actively constructed an identity centered on moral concerns, providing a strong sense of obligation and
commitment to living consistent with these concerns.
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Additionally, Lapsley and Narvaez [2004b; Narvaez & Lapsley, in
press] have posited a social-cognitive mechanism for linking moral
identity to moral behavior. A focal point of their perspective is the notion that individuals have schemas (i.e., cognitive-affective structures)
that guide how they perceive of, interpret, and respond to their social
environment. For schemas to be utilized in social contexts, they must
be accessible or readily activated. Regarding morality, ‘a person who
has a moral identity (…) would be one for whom moral constructs are
chronically accessible and easily activated for social information-processing’ [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b, pp. 200f]. As a practical example,
consider a woman whose identity is centered on kindness, and whose
conception of kindness includes holding doors open for other people when entering a building. According to Lapsley and Narvaez, this
woman would likely have readily available kindness schemas in place
such that she would not need to consciously deliberate about each opportunity to hold a door for another, but could function largely automatically in many situations.
One moral schema that may be of particular importance to moral
functioning is the individual’s understanding of what it means to be
a moral person [Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Walker & Hennig, 2004;
Walker & Pitts, 1998]. These conceptions of moral personality may
form cognitive prototypes capable of impacting social information
processing in moral situations [Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Walker &
Hennig, 2004]. Moreover, the cognitive accessibility of these moral
prototypes for information processing may be proportional to their
importance to the individual’s identity [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b].
When one’s moral prototype is central to one’s sense of self, there
may be increased motivation to live consistent with this conception
of what it means to be moral. Overlap between one’s moral prototype
and ideal or desired self may similarly compel moral action, as well as
drive moral growth, as seen in the lives of many of the moral exemplars studied by Colby and Damon [1992]. In short, the moral schema
literature, along with the moral identity literature, offer some insight
into links between identity and morality [for an additional perspective, see Monroe, 2001]. Yet, little empirical validation of these ideas
has occurred. Elucidation of the mechanisms linking identity to morality is central to work on moral identity; therefore, conceptual and
empirical investigation into this issue is strongly urged.
Third, what factors might mediate or moderate links between
moral identity and moral action? Even when moral principles are
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central to the self, they do not always lead directly and consistently
to the moral behavior which they dictate. Scholars have noted that
it is possible for individuals to act contrary to their sense of identity
[e.g., Blasi, 1983]. Thus, there must be certain factors that lie between
moral identity and moral behavior.
First, individuals must decide to act on their moral identity. Even
though, for example, a man may have judged that helping another is
the most moral thing to do in a certain situation, and decided that he
is personally responsible (based on his identity) for helping in that
situation, he will still need to decide to help. Therefore, the final decision is the decision of behavioral intention. Gollwitzer [1993] submits behavior intentions are proximal causes of behavior, and notes
that, ‘Whereas the attitude represents an evaluation of the action, the
respective intention is seen as the result of a decision to execute this
action’ (p. 145). So, although moral judgment and moral identity may
be seen as attitudes that influence behavior, ultimately a decision of
behavioral intention must be made, and in any given situation there
are multiple influences on this decision [Eisenberg, 1986; Nisan, 2004;
Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002]. Rest [1983] describes this as the choice to
prioritize the moral ideal over other concerns. For example, a teenage
girl sees an unpopular boy getting bullied, and knows that the right
thing to do would be to help the boy. She also feels a sense of obligation to help. However, there is the fear that she will get injured in trying to help the boy. Also, other peers are present, and not only is she
shy, but, since the victim is unpopular, helping him could tarnish her
image. Finally, she is late for her next class, and there is an important
test that day. As Social Domain Theorists remind us, and this example
illustrates, moral situations are complex [Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002].
Hence, moral identity must operate in the midst of many factors, both
individual and contextual. Individuals will not always choose to act
consistent with their moral identity; as a result, they will most likely
experience negative affective consequences [e.g., guilt; Blasi, 1983].
If one decides to act on one’s moral understanding and moral identity, there are still factors that may preclude the moral action from actually happening. More specifically, an individual may have a moral
identity and strong moral intentions, but lack the necessary skills
to follow through with those intentions [e.g., self-regulation; Blasi,
1983, 1995; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984]. Thus, although moral identity might be an important and often neglected piece of the puzzle of
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moral functioning, it is by no means the only piece [Nucci, 2004]. It
is but one factor in a multitude of factors that influence the likelihood
of individuals engaging in moral behavior. As such, research should
expand beyond examining bivariate links between moral identity and
moral action, and consider relations between these two constructs in
the contexts in which they occur. Also, it would be interesting to explore the role of moral identity in decisions of intention to act morally [Nucci, 2004].
Fourth, how does moral identity relate to everyday, more automatic, less reflective moral behavior? Most models of morality are primarily designed to account for moral action that is more deliberate –
the result of moral reflection and judgment; but, the majority of moral
action is likely more spontaneous or habitual [Davidson & Youniss,
1991; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, in press; Walker, 2004]. Moral
growth may largely be a matter of becoming more adept and fluid at
moral functioning, and a key factor in this process might be the progressive integration of individuals’ moral and self-systems [Colby &
Damon, 1992; Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Narvaez & Lapsley, in press;
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b]. This is evidenced by studies revealing the
extensive spontaneous moral actions and unhesitating moral commitments of moral exemplars [Colby & Damon, 1992; Monroe, 2004]. One
possible mechanism for this is that moral identity might entail having cognitively accessible moral schemas capable of carrying out some
aspects of moral functioning largely outside of consciousness [Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b; Narvaez & Lapsley, in
press; Walker & Hennig, 2004]. Additionally, when an individual has
a moral identity such that he or she strongly desires to be a moral person, it provides fertile ground to nurture moral instincts and foster
moral habits [Colby & Damon, 1992; Davidson & Youniss, 1991]. The
field will benefit greatly from efforts to better understand how moral
identity leads to greater facility and spontaneity of morality.
Fifth, how is moral identity related to prohibitive morality? Moral
identity research has primarily focused on understanding links between moral identity and prosocial behavior and commitment [e.g.,
Aquino & Reed, 2002; Arnold, 1993; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart &
Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004; Pratt et al., 2003; Reed &
Aquino, 2003], with few exceptions [e.g., Aquino, Ray, & Reed, 2003;
Barriga et al., 2001]. Furthermore, conceptual discussions of moral
identity generally seem more targeted at understanding moral identity
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as a source of motivation for action rather than inaction [e.g., Blasi,
1995]. However, morality involves both prescriptions and prohibitions
(i.e., principles dictating action and inaction) [Turiel, 2002] within
multiple dimensions, e.g., care and justice [Nunner-Winkler, 1984].
Hence, moral identity may motivate individuals to behave pro-socially
towards others as well as to avoid behaving antisocially towards them.
Yet at present, we know little about how moral identity relates to prohibitive morality, and whether it is differentially linked to prescriptive
and prohibitive morality. By expanding this research to a broader array of morally relevant behaviors and contexts, we will gain a fuller
picture of the role of moral identity in moral functioning.
Sixth, how does moral identity relate to other aspects of moral
personality, such as moral understanding and moral emotion? In response to the dominance of the narrowly-focused cognitive developmental approach to morality, an increasing number of scholars in
recent years have pushed for more integrative views of moral functioning [Blasi, 1995; Carlo, in press; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003;
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a; Walker & Hennig, 1997]. In large part this
is a movement towards a more holistic interest in moral personality
and in interconnections between the different facets of moral personality, such as moral understanding, moral emotion, moral identity, and
moral behavior. It is likely that moving forward in this regard will require new ways of thinking, and as Lapsley and Narvaez [in press]
have declared, ‘productive lines of moral psychological research in the
“post-Kohlbergian era” will be found by searching for integrative possibilities with other domains of psychological research.’ As an example
of this, Lapsley and Narvaez [2004b] drew from the social cognition
and information-processing literatures to develop their integrative
model of moral personality that emphasizes the role of cognitive-affective moral schemas in all components of moral functioning (perception, judgment, motivation, and action).
Of particular interest are the interrelations between moral identity, moral understanding, and moral emotion, and their relative roles
in motivating moral action. Gibbs [2003] recently discussed these
three facets of morality as the three primacies of moral motivation.
However, despite occasional acknowledgement by scholars that reasoning, emotion, and identity are all important to moral functioning, little has been done to empirically explicate links between these
three facets and to understand their relative role in relation to moral
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behavior. Part of the difficulty is that cognition, emotion, and identity are overlapping constructs and dimensions of human functioning [Damasio, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Reimer, 2003]. Therefore,
successful examination of these issues will likely require diverse, creative, and innovative methodological approaches.
One approach to understanding personality correlates of moral
identity is through in-depth exploration of moral exemplars, and comparing exemplars to non-exemplary individuals. As an example, Matsuba and Walker [2004] compared 40 young adult moral exemplars to
40 comparison individuals on personality traits, adult attachment, ego
identity, moral reasoning, and faith development; they found partial
support for relations between these facets of personality and moral exemplarity. To the degree that moral exemplars have identities centered
on morality, these results indicate potential personality correlates of
moral identity. However, moral identity was not directly assessed; thus,
implications of this research for moral identity are tentative. Still, exemplar research is the sort of methodological approach with promise
for elucidating the place of moral identity in moral personality.
Seventh, how does moral identity develop? We know little about
the processes by which moral identity develops. Several scholars have
proposed that moral identity development occurs as the moral and
self-systems, separate in childhood, become integrated or unified in
adolescence [Bergman, 2002; Blasi, 1995, 2001; Colby & Damon, 1992;
Damon, 1984, 2000; Nucci, 2001]. There is some empirical support for
this claim. For example, research on self-understanding development
from childhood through adolescence has revealed that moral principles are seldom used as self-descriptors until adolescence [Damon &
Hart, 1988]. When children do use moral self-descriptors, they tend to
be positive (e.g., ‘good’ or ‘nice’) and refer to the child’s external behavior [Damon & Hart, 1988; Power & Khmelkov, 1998]. Use of moral
terms in a self-evaluative or self-critical manner is infrequent prior
to adolescence [Power & Khmelkov, 1998]; and, according to Nucci
[2001], this capacity is necessary for the self to serve as a source of
moral motivation. Additionally, while young children may have a basic understanding of moral rules, they often lack the motivation and
sense of self-responsibility to act on them [Blasi, 1995, 2001; Keller &
Edelstein, 1993; Nunner-Winkler, 1998].
Little is known about the processes by which the separate developing systems of self and morality become united in some individuals,
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but some scholars have proffered ideas about how this might proceed
[Blasi, 1993, 1995, 2001, in press; Damon, 1984, 2000; Keller & Edelstein, 1993; see also Deci & Ryan, 1991]. As children start to reflect
on how their characteristics and behaviors affect others, they begin
to view themselves in moral terms (e.g., kind, honest, or fair). Further, through interactions with peers, parents, and others, children
to varying degrees develop appreciation and concern for morality;
hence, moral ideals become not only understood as objectively important, but important to them personally. These processes seem to signal the start of the integration of morality and self. The pinnacle of
this integration is when, in adolescence or adulthood, some individuals construct a unified identity around a core of deeply rooted moral
concerns. In short, as Blasi [1993] suggests, moral understanding and
concern for morality likely develop early, and what changes after that
is the relation between this developing morality and one’s identity.
Work is needed to further elucidate the developmental processes of
moral identity formation, including examination of the emergence of
concern for morality, subjective identity maturation, and the self-appropriation of moral concerns.
Eighth, what factors influence moral identity development? Identifying factors that foster moral identity development is imperative;
this sort of knowledge may be invaluable to moral education and youth
development efforts. Yet, little conceptual or empirical work has been
done to reveal such factors. Most work directly relevant to this issue
has been led by Daniel Hart [for a review of much of this work, see
Hart, in press]. Hart and colleagues have proposed, refined, and begun to empirically examine, a model of predictors of moral identity
development. This model posits five factors that influence moral identity formation. Two factors (the first layer of the model), personality
and social structure (e.g., socioeconomic status), are stable, resistant
to change, largely beyond the individual’s control, and are the foundation for many aspects of child and adolescent development. The other
three factors (the second layer of the model) more directly influence
and constitute moral identity, and are more malleable and under the
individual’s control: moral cognitions (e.g., moral judgments and attitudes), self and identity, and opportunities for moral action. Personality and social structure influence moral identity development
directly as well as indirectly by way of these second-layer factors. Using national datasets, with voluntary community service as a marker
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for moral identity, Hart and colleagues have found support for their
model [Atkins, Hart, & Donnelly, 2004; Hart, in press; Hart & Atkins,
2004; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998, 1999].
Others have echoed Hart’s [in press] supposition that engagement in moral action can lead to integration of morality into one’s
identity [Damon, 2000; Youniss & Yates, 1997]. In particular, Youniss
and Yates [1997] found evidence for this notion in their ethnographic
study of a youth service learning program. As part of a high school
social justice course, 160 students were required to work at an inner-city soup kitchen. In-class discussion and course assignments
probed students to reflect on moral ideals and their practical application. Then, service at the soup kitchen provided opportunities for
them to experience themselves acting on those moral ideals. Youniss
and Yates did not specifically assess moral identity at any point during their study. However, they reported that, over time, the youth involved in this program became aware of and reflected on moral and
social issues transcendent to themselves, such as homelessness, and
began to see themselves as agents capable of and responsible for making a difference and improving the well-being of others. During this
process of reflection and action, it seemed that many of these youth
were integrating moral ideologies and moral commitments into their
developing identities.
Additionally, some have suggested interaction in positive peer relationships facilitates moral identity development [Davidson & Youniss,
1991; Keller & Edelstein, 1993]. According to Davidson and Youniss
[1991], peer relationships, more characterized by equality and cooperation than relationships with adults, provide children and youth with
the experience of interacting according to the reciprocity norm. This
helps them progress from heteronomous egocentrism to autonomous
moral judgment and autonomous self-conscious personality. Thus, development in morality and identity is interconnected, and both arise
largely from early peer relationships. Similarly, Keller and Edelstein
[1993] posit that in peer relationships, children become aware of the
consequences their actions have for others. They come to realize that
the morality of their actions and their self is continually evaluated by
others. This leads to the development of a system for self-evaluation
of one’s actions and self-based on one’s moral ideals. Individuals are
then motivated, based on felt and anticipated positive and negative
self-evaluative affect, to act consistent with their moral ideals and the
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moral image of themselves they want to reach or maintain. In short,
peer interaction fosters socio-moral understanding and the development of a sense of moral self-responsibility.
Lastly, some suggest that certain aspects of the family context,
such as parenting styles and practices, might have an impact on identity formation [Grotevant, 1998] as well as the internalization of values [Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997]. In particular, democratic parenting
which provides a caring and supportive environment that encourages
autonomy may facilitate adolescents’ identity development and the integration of values into their emerging identities. Additionally, studies
of moral exemplars point to the importance of family context in the
development of moral identity [Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner,
1988]. Future studies should more systematically identify characteristics of family contexts most conducive to moral identity development.
Methodological Considerations
As researchers embark on empirical examination of links between
identity and morality, and explore important questions such as those
detailed above, they are urged to consider a few recommendations.
First, much more attention needs to be paid to the operationalization
and measurement of moral identity. Thus far, there have been several
approaches to moral identity assessment, each with its own strengths
and limitations. Some researchers tally the relative frequency with
which morally relevant terms are used in self-descriptions [e.g., Hart
& Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Steiner, 2004], have participants rate
the degree to which certain moral values are central to their sense of
self [e.g., Arnold, 1993; Pratt et al., 2003], or use other similar approaches [e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002]. These measures seem to essentially be assessing the relevance of morality to the self-as-object (or
self-concept), which corresponds to the facet of Blasi’s identity that
we have referred to as identity content. While this is a significant
part of moral identity to Blasi [2004; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] and others
[e.g., Moshman, 2005], identity is more advanced and complex than
self-concept; thus, much of what might be involved in moral identity
(e.g., subjective identity maturity) is being overlooked in these studies. Therefore, to suggest that these are all studies of moral identity either indicates differing conceptions of moral identity or a partial disconnection between the researchers’ conceptualizations and measures
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of moral identity. An additional limitation of measures such as these
is that they assume individuals have ready access to their moral identities; however, access to one’s cognitive schemata is complex [Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1980], and individuals sometimes distort their self-meanings [Moshman, 2004].
Some scholars have used other methods to indirectly assess moral
identity, possibly due to the challenges and limitations of using objective measures. For example, Hart and colleagues [Hart, in press]
have in several studies used voluntary community service as a marker
of moral identity. In other research, moral exemplars are nominated
by community leaders, and their moral exemplar status is used as an
indication of moral identity [e.g., Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Reimer,
2003]. These methods for assessing moral identity seem capable of
getting at more of the richness and complexity encompassed in moral
identity, but they require the assumption that individuals who engage
in high levels of prosocial behavior have moral identities. However,
it is uncertain to what extent such individuals have moral identities,
because their prosocial actions could have stemmed from a variety of
motivational sources (e.g., empathy, moral understanding, or selfish
concerns) without moral principles being central to their identities.
In essence, the different methods used thus far for measuring
moral identity all have their own strengths and limitations. While they
have yielded useful information regarding relations between self and
morality, none seem to assess moral identity in a way that is both direct and fully captures the moral identity construct. Therefore, it is
critical that effort is made to improve the way in which moral identity is operationalized and measured. In particular, we urge researchers to more clearly outline their conceptualizations of moral identity
and attend to designing valid measures that are congruent with these
conceptions.
Second, more methodological diversity and sophistication is
needed in research on moral identity. With few exceptions, moral identity studies have been cross-sectional, and all have been nonexperimental. In addition, most moral identity studies have involved small,
non-representative samples, which limit the generalizability of their
findings. Thus, longitudinal studies, and studies with larger, more diverse samples, can provide more information about causality, direction
of influence, and the nature of relations between identity and morality among various populations. Even more, cross-cultural explorations
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of moral identity are absent, but could prove invaluable in providing
insight into the relative role of identity in morality.
Third, applied research on moral identity is needed. Work on
moral identity may have promising implications for moral education,
youth development programs, and various interventions. Traditionally such programs have not targeted promotion of positive or moral
self-concept and identity, focusing instead on promoting one or two
other components of morality, such as teaching moral values, or building empathic responding or moral reasoning abilities. There are exceptions, however, such as the service learning program explored by
Youniss and Yates [1997], which promoted moral development, identity development, and aided youth in integrating moral commitment
into their emerging sense of identity.
Fourth, researchers should seek to draw from diverse literatures
in understanding moral identity. For example, Lapsley and Narvaez
[2004b] based their model on social-cognitive and information-processing literatures, Reimer [2003] drew on cognitive neuroscience
research, and Matsuba and Walker [2004] incorporated work in personality. The literature on self and identity is very rich in theory and
empirical research but, as yet, moral identity scholars have not taken
advantage of this literature. With the exception of Blasi [1983, 1984,
1993, 1995], most moral identity researchers have focused more on
the ‘moral’ side of the concept to the neglect of the ‘identity’ side. One
example of an area of research that could inform moral identity research is that on the multidimensional structure of self [Harter, 1999].
Moral identity models have emphasized the importance of morality
to one’s global self-concept and identity. However, in recent years the
trend has been towards thinking of the self as multidimensional [Harter, 1999]. Thus, not only is there a global sense of self, but individuals
also have selves specific to certain domains (e.g., peer relationships,
school, jobs, and athletics). Moreover, Harter [1999] suggests that
beginning in adolescence a domain specific self-concept may emerge
for morality. Therefore, future research could explore the relevance
of this work to research on moral identity.
As research on moral identity expands through improved methodology and refined measurement, the strengths and limitations of current thinking on moral identity will be further revealed. For example,
further longitudinal studies may yield evidence of bidirectional relations between moral identity and moral action. Cross-cultural studies
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may find that moral identity takes different forms in different cultures, or plays an important moral role in some cultures but not others. Studies comparing the relative influence on moral action of moral
reasoning, moral emotion, and moral identity may find that the role
of moral identity, comparatively, is less significant than anticipated.
Continued examination of moral identity will likely result in the need
to revise or dispense of existing models linking identity and morality.

Conclusion
To help us more fully understand moral functioning, and moral motivation more specifically, Blasi [1983, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2004b,
in press] and others [Arnold, 1993; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bergman,
2002; Carlo, in press; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs,
2003; Hart, in press; Hoffman, 2000; Keller & Edelstein, 1993; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Lapsley & Narvaez,
2004b; Monroe, 2001; Moshman, 2005; Nisan, 2004; Nucci, 2001;
Nunner-Winkler, 1998; Power & Kmhelkov, 1998; Pratt et al., 2003;
Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004; Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982;
Walker, 2004; Youniss & Yates, 1997] have advocated a role for the
self in morality. However, little empirical research has examined identity as a source of motivation for moral action and commitment, leaving many conceptual notions of moral identity unexplored. Thus far,
evidence suggests that individuals highly committed to moral causes
seem to experience unity between their self and moral goals [Colby
& Damon, 1992], and tend to more frequently use moral terms to describe their self than other individuals [Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer
& Wade-Stein, 2004]. Further, the more individuals see moral virtues
and values as important to their sense of self, the more likely they are
to engage in moral behavior [Arnold, 1993; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed
& Aquino, 2003; Pratt et al., 2003]. Hence, it seems connections do exist between the self and morality. However, questions of what constitutes moral identity, and how and why it is linked to moral behavior
and commitment (including questions regarding causal directionality), remain unclear, and largely unexamined. Even more, some rightfully remain skeptical of the relative importance of identity in comparison to other components of morality [e.g., Nucci, 2004; Turiel,
2002]. Through conceptual refinement, and improved and expanded
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research methodology, further understanding of the role and significance of identity in moral functioning can be gained.
It is hoped that this paper will stimulate dialogue regarding moral
identity, provoke questions, and suggest possible avenues by which
the field can move forward through conceptual and empirical investigation of this intriguing concept. It seems an exciting new frontier is
opening in moral psychology, where more consideration will be given
to the role of identity in moral functioning. Although it is still a fledgling research area, work on moral identity promises to move the field
beyond predominant paradigms that have focused on certain dimensions of morality (e.g., moral reasoning or moral emotion), and will
urge scholars to think about moral functioning in a more complex, integrative, and holistic manner. Finally, moral identity theory and research will help the field progress further in understanding what motivates and sustains moral behavior and commitment, an endeavor
with important implications for moral psychology as well as society
more broadly.
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